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The Computer and the Mud Hut:
Notes on Multinational Enterprise
in Developing Countries
A. A. FATOUROS*
The emergence of "multinational enterprise" has been enthusias-
tically hailed and assiduously discussed in business literature for more
than a decade. Interest has spread to economists1 and more recently to
jurists.2 For cogent reasons most studies deal with the problems of
multinational enterprise in developed coun'tries. Its actual and pos-
sible role in less developed countries is still rather neglected.3 In this
'Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington).
This article is part of a larger study prepared under the auspices of the
International Development Research Center at Indiana University. In my work on
the topicat hand I have greatly profited from particip ation in a research project on
the multinaonal corporation directed by Professors I. A. Litvak and C. J. Maule,
of Carleton University, Ottawa.
1. It should be noted in fairness that a French "school" of economists, led by
Francois Perroux -nd the late Maurice Bye, started studying the topic in the middle
fifties. See especially Bye, La grande unit6 interterritoriale dans l'industrie
extractive et ses plans, CAHIERS DE L'I.S.E.A. (Ser. F., No. 2, 1956); By6,
L'autofinan cement de la grande unit interterritoriale t les dimensions temporelles
de sonplan, 67 REVUE D'ECONOMIE PoLITIQUE 269 (1957), repr. in 2 ECONOMIES Er
SocIgrEs: CAHIERS DE L' I.S.E.A. 1745 (1968) (an interesting issue reprinting several
early French articles on multinational firms) and in English transl. in 8 INT'L EcON.
PAPERS 147 (1958); M. BY9, RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES 177-179
(1959). And cf. note 16 infra.
2. The best recent manifestations of this interest are Vagts, The Multinational
Enterprise: A New Challenge For Transnational Law, 83 HARv L REV. 739 (1970)
and Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Sceptic's Analy-
sis, 3 L. & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 1 (1971). For a perceptive earlier study, on a
different tack, see Miller, The Corporation As A Private Government in the World
Community, 46 VA. L REV. 1539 (1960). Cf also Baum, The Global Corporation:
An American Challenge to the Nation-State, 55 IOWA L REV. 410 (1969). A
valuable paper, I. Feltham & W. Rauenbusch, Multinational Enterprises in Canada;
Foreign-Owned Enterprises in Canada, Aug. 1971 (mimeo.), reached me after this
paper was completed.
3. But see Oliver, Speculations on Developing Country Reception of Multina-
tional Enterprise, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 192 (1971); Harry G. Johnson, The
Multinational Corporation as an Agency of Economic Development: Some Explora-
tory Observations, in THE WIDENING GAP-DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1970's 242 (B.
Ward, L. D'Anjou and J. D. Runnalls eds. 1971). Professor Johnson observes, id. at
242, that "both economic theory and economic policy have been slow in recognizing
this phenomenon .... " How slow may be illustrated by a 1968 review of the
WATKINS REPORT (infra note 49) which chides its authors for being "excessively
impressed by the concept of the multinational corporation as a new and revolution-
ary entity ... that has been propagandized in recent years by the International
Chamber of Commerce and the Harvard Business School" and for their "excessive
excitement about the novelty of the multinational corporation .... Johnson, The
Watkins Report - Towards A New National Policy? 23 INT'L J. 615, at 616, 622
(1968).
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paper I attempt to study some of the definitional and conceptual
problems of "multinational enterprise," review briefly the possible
balance of benefits and costs for less developed countries, and examine
the need and possible forms of legal regulation. The state of knowl-
edge-as distinguished from guesses, hopes and fears-in this area is
such that many questions and few answers are warranted.
Reading large doses of business writings on the multinational
enterprise is liable to provoke what may be called the "Aristides
syndrome." 4 Enthusiasm is so unrestrained, praise so fulsome, self-
satisfaction so evident in much of the literature, that it only takes
normal human perversity to react negatively, making unkind com-
ments and discovering faults in every argument and dark sides in every
bright achievement. One must guard against such a reaction.
Definitions and Their Consequences
There is no generally accepted definition of "multinational enter-
prise." The-very terminology is not yet settled and a plethora of words
for either of the two components of the term is in use.5 The uncer-
tainty is no doubt due, in part, to the relative novelty of the concept
and of the type of industrial organization it refers to, but it should also
be attributed to the multiplicity of uses to which the term may be and
is put. In its origins, the term was rather tendentious, intended mostly
to replace obviously derogatory terms or terms emphasizing a firm's
"foreignness," and to thus induce a favorable (or avoid a negative)
reaction. Frequent use has made its connotations more neutral; even
4. [A]s the voters were inscribing their ostraka [sherds, pieces of earthen-
ware on which Athenians scratched the name of the person to be
exiled - "ostracised"], it is said that an unlettered and utterly boorish
fellow handed his ostrakon to Aristides, whom he took to be one of the
ordinary crowd, and asked him to write Aristides on it. He, astonished,
asked the man what possible wrong Aristides had done him. "None
whatever," was the answer, "I don't even know the fellow, but I am
tired of hearing him everywhere called 'The Just.'" On hearing this,
Aristides made no answer, but wrote his name on the ostrakon and
handed it back.
PLUTARCH, ARISTIDES, vii (Perrin transl.).
5. E.g., for the adjective: world, global, plurinational, transnational, interna-
tional; and for the noun: firm, corporation, company, business. Compare By6's term
"grande unit6 interterritoriale," supra note 1.
This paper deals with "private" enterprise only, not with international public
enterprise or nongovernmental non-profit organizations. For related discussions and
distinctions, see Goldman, The Law of International Companies, 90 J. DROIT INT'L
(CLUNEr) 321 (1963); Kahn, International Companies, 3 J. WORLD TRADE L 498
(1969); Harrod, Non-governmental Organizations and the Third World, 1970 Y. B.
WORLD AFF. 170; Angelo, Multinational Corporate Enterprise, 125 HAGUE ACADEMY
Ir'rr'L L., RECUEIL DES COURs 443, 467-472 (1968).
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those not enamored of the development now freely use the term. 6
Considerable ambiguity remains along with a degree of deliberate or
unintended tendentiousness.
Several classifications and definitions have been proposed.7 Each
in its own way contains two distinct elements. For an enterprise to be
multinational, (a) it must operate in a significant manner in several
national territories and (b) there must be unified management so that
operations in any particular country are under the integrated direction
of company headquarters. The two elements differ substantially from
one another. The first is relatively objective; its presence can be
determined by study of empirical, especially quantitative, data and its
content is fairly clear. It corresponds, by and large, to established
definitions of "direct private foreign investment." Normally, a compa-
ny is multinational if it engages in production outside the territory of
its home state. If its foreign activities consist exclusively of export sales
it probably would not qualify. Some ambiguity still obtains with
respect to various possible arrangements among firms, including licens-
ing of industrial property and joint ventures, which might allow a
significant degree of control over production. The second element of
the definition is different in nature: it is "subjective," in the sense that
it refers to matters of attitude and involves assessments of managerial
policies for which no hard data are likely to be extensively available.
Yet, it is indispensable for distinguishing between multinational enter-
prise and other forms of foreign investment.
While most writers insist on the importance of the second ele-
ment, empirical discussions of the prevalence, distribution and impor-
tance of multinational enterprise are uniformly based on data reflect-
ing the first element alone. This may be attributed, to some extent, to
a plausible but unproven assumption: an enterprise engaging in sig-
nificant multinational operations is likely to be managed on an inte-
grated, global basis. There are serious problems with this assumption,
especially with respect to less developed countries, but they will be
6. Cf., e.g., Review of the Month - Notes on the Multinational Corporation,
21 MONTHLY REV. 1-13 (esp. at 2-3) (Oct. 1969).
7. Good discussions of alternative definitions and classifications may be found
in Litvak & Maule, The Multinational Corporation: Some Perspectives, 13 CAN.
PUB. AD. 129 (1970); S. ROLFE, THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 11-16 (Back-
ground Report, Int'l Chamber of Commerce, 1969); C. KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD 179-185 (1969). For useful illustrative descriptions, see L TURNER,
INVISIBLE EMPIRES 14-24 (1971); Houssiaux, La grande entreprise plurinationale, 17
ECONOMIE APPLIQUE 403, 424-436 (1965); F. DONNER, THE WORLD-WIDE INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISE (1967). The historical record is comprehensively covered in M.
WILKINS, THE EMERGENCE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO 1914 (1970).
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discussed later. At any rate, the criteria most often used are the
presence of subsidiaries in other countries,8 the percentage of sales,
assets, or employees outside the home country,9 and the quotation of
shares in foreign stock exchanges. 10 To bridge the gap between exter-
nal criteria of size and location and the internal test of executive
attitudes and policies it has been suggested that the firm's managerial
structure and organization should be the main criterion.n However,
this criterion too cannot be fully conclusive: formal organization often
takes quite some time to catch up with actual policies; conversely,
managerial attitudes can generally resist or overcome organizational
restraints.
This is an area where statistics are supremely important. And
available statistics deal in the main with United States-based firms.
Indeed one writer has suggested that the visibility of United States-
based multinational corporations is primarily due to the quality of
American statistics. 12 The figures reflecting the foreign operations of
United States-based enterprise are impressive. The most modest, but
at the same time the best documented, are those in the Department of
Commerce studies on the "international investment position" of the
United States: at the end of 1969, the total book value of U.S. direct
investments abroad stood at nearly $71 billion. 13 Particularly interest-
ing are the calculations which focus on "international production,"
itself a novel concept: the total output of foreign subsidiaries of
United States companies and of foreign firms partly owned by United
States companies was in 1968 over $200 billion, a figure to be com-
pared to a United States Gross National Product (GNP) of over $860
billion, a combined Western European (European Economic Commu-
nity) GNP of $360 billion, and total U.S. exports of $33 billion. If to
8. Cf. UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 1968-69 (1969), repr. in Angelo, supra note 5, at 575-600; J. VAUPEL
& J. CURHAN, THE MAKING OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1969) (by inference
since no definition of the key term is given); M. WILKINS, supra note 7, at ix and
passim.
9. Cf. S. ROLFE, supra note 7, at 13, 150-157; Robock & Simmonds, Internation-
al Business: How Big Is It - The Missing Measurements, 5 COLUM. J. WORLD
BUSINESS 6, 18 (May-June 1970).
10. Cf Rolfe, The International Corporation in Perspective, in THE MULTI-
NATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 5,23 (S. Rolfe & W. Damm eds. 1970).
11. See R. ROBINSON, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT 151-156 (1967).
12. "[A] good part of le d~fi americain lies in les statistiques americaines."
Rolfe, supra note 10, at 9.
13. Devlin & Kruer, The International Investment Position of the United
States: Developments in 1969, 50 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 21, 26 and passim
(Oct. 1970). It is generally acknowledged that book value figures greatly understate
the actual worth of foreign assets. By the end of 1970, total book value of foreign
direct investments was reported to have reached $77 billion.
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United States investments abroad are added foreign investments of
other developed countries, in one another and in the United States, we
reach a total for "internationally tinged product . . . close to $500
billion out of $1800 billion-some 28%."14 Such rough figures are valu-
able indications of the orders of magnitude involved. But available
data remain inadequate and fragmentary. Professors Robock and Sim-
monds point out, for instance, that, if the specificity of multinational
enterprise is to be taken seriously, then, to reach an understanding of
the amount of "international business" being conducted, we must add
together not only direct foreign investment, to and from the United
States, and the related product, but also the domestic production of
multinational companies in their home countries, as well as the inter-
national trade in goods and services among the companies con-
cerned. 15 The two authors insist further on the necessity for a revised
understanding of international economics, centered around the firm
rather than the nation ("countries do not export, firms do"), and
covering trade of tangible and intangible goods, sale of services, invest-
ment and related operations, all seen as alternative options for particu-
lar firms. This is indeed a direction in which theoretical international
economics has been expanding in the past decade. 16
Putting economic theory problems on one side, it is quite obvious
that what available statistics describe is "private foreign investment"
as it used to be called, not "multinational enterprise" as such. For it is
the second element in the latter's definition that gives to that concept,
and to the phenomenon it refers to, its novel and peculiar character. It
is its centralized direction, the ability to bring together in a single
integrated process operations in many different countries, that marks
14. J. Polk, Economic Implications of the Multinational Corporation, in The
Multinational Corporation. Highlights and Background Papers [for a] Conference
Held at the Department of State, Feb. 14, 1969, at 15 (mimeo). Approaching these
figures from yet another angle, Dr. Polk estimated that such -internationally-
tinged" production represented about one sixth ($450 billion) of Gross World
Product, calculated at $3,000 billion. See Statement of J. Polk, in A Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy for the 1970's-Part 4-The Multinational Corporation and Interna-
tional Investment, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy,
Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 770, 776 (1970).
15. Robock & Simmonds, supra note 9.
16. See especially Bertin, La morphologie des relations internationales (Essai
d'une prisentation integrie), ECONOMIES ET SOCILLTE: CAHIERS DE L'I.S.E.A., 128 ff
(May 1967). And cf. Caves, Foreign Investment, Trade and Industrial Growth, in
EssAYS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 9 (J. Bain ed. 1970); Caves, Industrial Econom-
ics of Foreign Investment - The Case of the International Corporation, 5 J. WORLD
TRADE L 303 (1971); Vernon, International Investment and International Trade
in the Product Cycle, 80 Q. J. ECON. 190 (1966); Hymer, La grande "corporation"
multinationale, 19 REVUE ECONOMIQUE 949 (1968); C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 7.
For a comprehensive and readable survey of developments and problems, see R.
BARBER, THE AMERICAN CoRPORATION 233-285 (1970).
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the modern multinational enterprise as a new phenomenon, infre-
quent and indeed unlikely under past conditions. The relative liberal-
ization of international trade, the quantitative and qualitative changes
in international communications, the boom in technologically sophisti-
cated production (which is primarily involved in multinational enter-
prise activities), are factors which have determined the development
of modern multinational enterprise by making possible continuing
and effective managerial control from a single center of decision.
Managerial techniques, including use of computers and mathematical
formulas, developed in response to needs have further enhanced the
control's effectiveness. The comprehensiveness of the central manage-
ment's involvement is stressed in most of the business literature.
Despite variations of degree and kind in the manner and extent
of centralized decision-making, central management is generally de-
scribed as retaining extensive control over the planning of the sub-
sidiaries' operations.' 7 Although financial considerations and strategies
play an important, perhaps preponderant, role, they are not, according
to these views, the sole concern of central management. In this respect,
business descriptions contradict those Marxian discussions which insist
on the purely financial role of central management.' 8
The combination of centralized management and geographically
widespread operations endows multinational enterprise with a singu-
larly expanded horizon of activities in time as well as in space. It
possesses the capability selectively to utilize resources located in several
territories, to transfer, or withhold, resources from country to country,
and to choose appropriate modes and degrees of operation, in accord-
ance with the management's perception of company interest. It is thus
able to take advantage of the conditions-natural, financial, political,
and legal-prevailing in any particular country, and to evade,-.when
necessary, some of the effects of such conditions. Compared to other
business firms, the multinational corporation possesses an enhanced
relative ability to shape its own environment and an increased relative
freedom from external constraints.
The discrepancy between accepted definitions and the criteria on
the basis of which data are compiled allows certain fundamental uncer-
tainties to persist at the core of all discussions of multinational enter-
17. See, e.g., the detailed discussions in M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS, THE
STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 21-124 (1970); J. FAYERWEATHER, INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT - A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 133-207 (1969).
18. See Review of the Month-Notes on the Multinational Corporation,
MONTHLY REVIEW 1, 6-7 (Nov. 1969). To a layman it would seem that this is a point
on which empirical research could provide significant clarification.
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prise. A necessary precondition for further serious study is the formu-
lation of an operational definition combining both objective and sub-
jective elements with the help of which empirical data can be collect-
ed. Even then some difficulties will persist. As in all cases where
theoretical models are placed against fluid realities, distinctions be-
tween enterprises engaging in international operations are very much
a matter of degree. The extent and the quality of integrated manage-
ment may differ from firm to firm. Even where firms meet all related
criteria, generalizations on that basis alone may not be warranted for
every purpose. The significance of differences between kinds of mul-
tinational enterprise must be acknowledged: Standard Oil (N.J.),
General Motors and IBM are all multinational corporations, no doubt,
but in many respects their differences are more important than their
similarities. Moreover, potential as well as actual policies must enter
into the picture: even though at any given time there may be no
effective centralized management, an enterprise's foreign ownership
may represent a possibility of future influence on the strategy and
attitudes of individual national components.
The Non-International Multinational Enterprise.
It must be kept in mind that the multinational character attaches
to the enterprise's operations alone, not to its legal or political status.
Legally, the term "multinational" is meaningless; of the other adjec-
tives proposed only "international" normally has legal connotations,
but it is generally agreed that it is not intended to invoke them. The
legal structure of multinational firms may or may not reflect their
managerial structure. The relationship between the two is often a
persuasive illustration of the irrelevance of legal form for much of
business practice. Elaborate, and sometimes quite ingenious, legal for-
mulas have been devised to allow firms to operate efficiently across
national borders, but these are responses to strictly legal (i.e., techni-
cal legal) rather than economic or managerial problems and needs.
To determine the nationality19 of corporations nations employ
several criteria: place of incorporation, of headquarters or of principal
operations, nationality of shareholders.2 0 No single criterion is ac-
cepted in all national legal systems; indeed, no country appears to rely
19. Use of the term "nationality" involves, of course, application by analogy of
certain concepts which obtain with respett to individual human beings. While at
first blush the analogy may appear convenient and plausible, it may ultimately
create more problems than it resolves, because it distorts reality and induces
misperceptions.
20. For an excellent brief review of the whole area in the context of the
multinational enterprise, see Vagts, supra note 2, at 740-743.
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for all purposes on a single test. Such multiplicity and ambiguity of
criteria are not necessarily to be regretted. There is no absolute value
in total consistency: it may be quite appropriate to treat a company as
foreign for some purposes and as domestic for others. The demand for
total clarity and consistency in the application of criteria for the
nationality of corporations often hides an attempt to serve the (finan-
cial) convenience of companies by giving legal sanction and effect to
their forum-shopping.
Similar considerations apply in public international law where
the strict legal status of corporations and especially their effective
nationality are obscure and confused. The recent Barcelona Traction
case, 21 for all its faults, may be seen as a denial of the right of
shareholders to shop around for a convenient state of incorporation as
well as a friendly protector state. Other developments may point to
new possibilities. An example is found in the World Bank-sponsored
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes which provides
for the possibility of determining, by agreement between a host coun-
try and a foreign corporation, the latter's effective legal nationality for
particular purposes (e.g., concerning conciliation or arbitration pro-
ceedings under the convention.) 22
In terms of the legal nationality and political allegiance of top
level management, multinational corporations are hardly multination-
al, either. Kenneth Simmonds' excellent study has shown that, in
overwhelming majority, United States-based multinational corpora-
tions are managed by American nationals; the proportion of high-level
foreign managers is minimal.23 There is no indication that the situa-
tion is significantly changing or that, apart from a few well-known
exceptions, it is at all different in corporations based in other de-
veloped nations. Whether and to what extent legal nationality reflects
political loyalties is a highly speculative question, but common sense
and what little empirical evidence there is suggest that there is a close
connection between the two. It is more of an open question how, and
how far, national loyalties affect business decisions. A person may be
loyal to his nation without subordinating his firm's interests to specific
21. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970]
I.C.J. 3
22. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 25(2) (b). For an inquiry into this and other
possible devices and methods, see Kahn, La determination de la qualit6 de
commergant 6tranger dans les accords de commerce international, in HAGUE
ACADEMY INT'L L., COLLOQUIUM 1968 - INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 235 (G.
Kojanec ed. 1969).
23. Simmonds, Multinational? Well, Not Quite, in WORLD BUSINESS - PROMISES
AND PROBLEMS 43 (C. Brown ed. 1970). And cf. Thackray, Not So Multinational,
AfterAll, 2 INTERPLAY 23 (Nov. 1968).
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governmental policies. Certain pervasive fundamental biases may well
persist.
On another level, the ability of top executives of multinational
firms to act in an "international" manner, or to see themselves as so
acting, is predicated on acceptance of a political ideology which posits
a rigid distinction between public and private policies and actions. In a
characteristic sentence, a perceptive analyst points out that "the com-
panies themselves are not 'multinational' in a political sense, though
they are trying to be so commercially."2 4 His discussion of the difficul-
ties of that attempt illustrates the impossibility of the distinction
between political and commercial policies at the level at which mul-
tinational enterprise operates. It is a philosophical commonplace that
freedom of trade and investment are essentially political positions;
they reflect the extent to which freedom serves the political and
economic systems prevailing in the countries involved.2 5 Finally, the
size and importance of most multinational firms make it likely that,
whatever the intentions of their executives, the companies' home gov-
ernment will be interested in them and will seek to strengthen their
loyalty and, on occasion, influence their policies. Whatever its vicissi-
tudes after the Barcelona Traction case, the whole institution of diplo-
matic protection, on the virtues of which the legal spokesmen for multi-
national enterprise have often insisted with vigor and eloquence, is a
refutation of the non-national character of the enterprise and of its
effective internationalization. 26
Multinational Enterprise In -Developing Countries
The significance of debates concerning definition becomes evident
when it is attempted to determine the extent of multinational enter-
prise activities in less developed nations. The fact is that, with very
24. J. BEHRMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 8
(1970) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL INTEREsrs].
25. American insistence on an "op en door" policy by host countries, by no
means merely a historical memory, ll ustrates clearly the connection. Demands
directed at imposing an "open door" policy are still made. See the brief critique of
recent efforts in Goldberg & Kindleberger, infra note 53, at 297, note 3.
26. Following the logic of this proposition the director of the most comprehen-
sive study of multinational enterprise has suggested the necessity for adopting
internationally a variant of the Calvo clause ("the principle that foreign-owned
subsidiaries were foreclosed from appealing to the diplomatic support of the
governments of their parents on pain of losing their rights as nationals") coupled
with an effective grant of national treatment. See Statement of R. Vernon, A
Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970's - Part 1. Survey of the Issues, Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic
Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 4, 1969), at 150 (1970); and Vernon, The
Role of U.S. Enterprise Abroad, 98 DAEDALUS 113, 132 (1969); Vernon, The
Multinational Enterprise: Power versus Sovereignty, 49 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 736,
748-749 (1971).
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few exceptions, we only know about "direct private foreign invest-
ment" in these countries, not about multinational enterprise. The
vague presumption that the two may largely coincide is not a sufficient
basis for quantitative evaluation.
Professor Jack N. Behrman has observed that multinational cor-
porations, properly so called, operate almost exclusively among the
developed, North Atlantic, countries. 27 Operations in developing
countries, according to him, conform in the main to one of two mod-
els, neither of which can be considered truly multinational. First is
the traditional ("classical" or "colonial") model of direct foreign in-
vestment, especially in extractive industries (mining, oil, planta-
tions), where the operation in the host country is intended exclusively,
or nearly so, to serve the markets of the home country or third coun-
tries through exportation of raw materials. The second model, the "in-
ternational holding company," is that of a company controlling,
within several foreign countries, firms whose operations are directed
at the local market; such subsidiaries normally have a high degree of
autonomy, the parent company retaining an essentially inactive,
rentier-like interest.
Although certain qualifications are called for, Professor
Behrman's basic point is very well taken. It is probable that a consid-
erable number of foreign-owned firms in the less developed countries
operate on the "international holding company" model. It is particu-
larly likely that this managerial structure obtains in many (but not
all) instances where foreign firms have entered into joint ventures
with the local government or with local private interests. Moreover,
the very old-fashioned kind of foreign investment cannot be totally
excluded: the case of the individual foreigner in a less developed
country who owns plantations, mines, or even factories and becomes a
major economic power in the host state is admittedly rarer nowadays
than it once was, but it is by no means extinct.28
On the other hand, it is by no means clear why most foreign
companies engaged in extractive industries and exploitation of natural
resources should not be considered multinational in the strictest sense
27. Behrman, Can Governments Slay the Dragons of Multinational Enterprise?,
1971 EUROPEAN BUSINESS 53-55 (Winter 1971). See also J. BEHRMAN, SOME
PATTERNS IN THE RISE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE Xiii (1969).
28. A related sub-category of cases, which creates serious problems in many of
the new countries of Africa and Asia, is that of the presence of ethnically distinct
classes of small business men and middlemen, often established in the host country
during colonial times. For a comprehensive exploration of related problems, see F.
GOLAY ET AL., UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(1969).
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of the term.29 Oil companies are the prototype of the multinational
company, not merely in terms of size and geographic expansion but
particularly in view of their managerial policies.30 The amount of
production, the direction of sales, the prices and terms of payment, the
employment policies and transport tactics, are all centrally determined
with a view to maximizing the profits of the enterprise as a whole and
not those of each unit. It is undeniable, on the other hand, that the
external constraints on extractive firms differ significantly from those
on manufacturing firms. The degree and quality of the flexibility they
dispose is correspondingly different.
The conclusion at this point can only be that we lack the systema-
tic data to provide any quantitative description and breakdown of
multinational enterprise activities in the less developed countries.
Much essential factual information is unavailable. We need to know
more about the number and size of such firms, their incidence in the
various industries and countries, the degree and variations of their
managerial centralization (with probable differentiations according to
industry, size, home nationality and other variables). We need to
know more about the actual consequences of centralized management,
not only from the standpoint of the firm's profits or smoothness of
operation, but in its impact on the industry and the national economy.
Better to understand its role and importance it will be useful to study
cases of real or imagined conflicts (and their resolution) within joint
ventures.
The Impact of Multinational Enterprise
An attempt to study the benefits and costs of multinational enter-
prise operations in less developed countries meets the same problem.
To the limited extent that the relevant literature refers to these
countries, it largely deals with private foreign investment in general,
not with issues peculiar to multinational enterprise.
While it is convenient to speak of benefits and costs as if they
were discrete quantities, it is clear that they are both aspects of (better
yet, they represent judgments concerning) the effects of multinational
29. A high proportion of United States and Western European private foreign
investments in developing countries is indeed in petroleum and mining. At the end
of 1969 $10.15 billion out of $20 billion U.S. private direct investment in such coun-
tries was in petroleum, mining and smelting. Devlin and Kruer, supra note 13,
at 28 (table 6).
30. Cf. the two articles by Bye, supra note 1; E. T. Penrose, the Large
INTERNATIONAL FIRM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES- THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY (1968); Adelman, The Multinational Corporation in World Petroleum, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 227 (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970).
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enterprise operations.31 They can be separately discussed only with
the understanding that in reality they are closely tied to one another.
A list of the benefits would include the same things often men-
tioned in connection with private foreign investment in general: capi-
tal, foreign exchange, managerial and technological skills, export chan-
nels, willingness and ability to take initiatives. There may be slight
differences in degree. Technological expertise and the ability to estab-
lish export channels are enhanced.3 2 On the other hand, claims that
multinational enterprise executives are peculiarly sensitive to the in-
terests and sensibilities of less developed countries are of highly dubi-
ous validity. Evidence to support or to invalidate them is lacking and
one falls back on inferences of ambiguous import and on contradictory
individual cases and anecdotes.
The disadvantages of multinational enterprise are also in major
part those of private foreign investment although some may be more
acute because of specific features of multinational enterprise. The
likely size of the firm may be a significant factor,5 8 especially when
seen in the context of oligopolistic industries where a few large interna-
tionally-operating firms dominate and where few choices are open
to prospective host countries. Since multinational corporations general-
31. In this sense, Professor Johnson correctly criticizes the by now wide-
spread host country demand for "maximizing benefits and minimizing costs" of
foreign investment. It is net benefit, or the balance of benefits and costs, that must
be considered. See Johnson, The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of the
International Corporation, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 35, 45 (C. Kindle-
berger ed. 1970). However, since many of the costs, and even some benefits, are
intangible, unquantifiable and inherently fuzzy, such expressions must be under-
stood as metaphors, rather than as strict economic propositions.
32. Concerning the latter, see De La Torre, Exports of Manufactured Goods
From Developing Countries: Marketing Factors and the Role of Foreign Enterprise,
2 J. INT'L Bus. STUDIES 26 (1971).
33. A recent study raises interesting questions as to the extent to which large
firms are truly multinational. Professor R. B. Stobaugh distinguishes between small,
medium-sized and large firms operating internationally and finds that the medium-
sized firms "have a greater tendency than the other enterprises to attempt an
over-all systems optimization approach and more nearly approach the economists'
concept of one 'economic man' running the enterprise from headquarters." Small
firms do not possess the resources for such an approac and they tend therefore to
allow a greater measure of independence to their subsidiaries. Larger firms are too
complex for precise centralized management; their home offices prefer to use "rules
of thumb," instead of examining each situation by itself, and to issue "guidelines"
rather than definite instructions. Stobaugh, The Multinational Corporation: Mea-
suring the Consequences, 6 COLUM. J. WORLD BUSINZSS 59, 62 (Jan-Feb. 1971);
Stobaugh, Financing Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S.-Controlled Multinational Enter-
prises, 1 J. INT'L BUSINESS STUDIES 43 (1970). These findings, however, speak to the
effectiveness and precision of centralized management in large firms rather than to
its existence. The autonomy of the foreign subsidiary is still restricted; the relative
uniformity of the policies dictated by central management may indeed increase the
firm's rigidity and lack of adaptability.
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ly tend to be larger and wealthier,3 4 the inequality in bargaining
capability between the two parties in interest, the firm and the host
government, may be more pronounced. Moreover, the presence of
foreign firms imports a bias in favor of a certain kind of development
which may be particularly significant in the case of multinational
firms, the complexity of their operations may make them more rigid
in their responses to conditions in each host country while, because of
their size, overall strength, and flexibility in evading restrictions, they
can better afford such rigidity. Recent signs of dissatisfaction within
the now developed countries have made us more aware of the limita-
tions and disadvantages of the type of economic development preva-
lent in them.3 5 The multinational enterprise may be an institution
well adapted for transmitting the benefits (and disadvantages) of that
kind of development. By doing so, however, and precisely because of
its efficiency and effectiveness, it may restrict the host countries' op-
tions; 36 it may tend to bring about excessive uniformity and rein-
force homogeneity to the sacrifice of at least potential pluralism and
local variations in culture and life style.
All these are features common to most private foreign investment,
rendered more acute by the structure and size of multinational enter-
prise. The possible consequences of the latter's special features raise
even more difficult problems. The most fundamental of these is the
firm's centralized management, which enhances the flexibility of the
firm in its international operations.
The multinational firm's vaunted flexibility may be understood as
the ability to avoid the effects of economic and other conditions pre-
vailing at a particular time in a particular national territory by
relying on resources available in other nations and on an expanded
ime-horizon of activities. In other words, the firm is able extensively
to avoid (or seriously to lessen the effects of) market conditions pre-
vailing in a particular territory by operating in a more broadly delim-
34. In 1957, according to the last comprehensive U.S. Department of Com-
merce census, forty-five firms accounted for nearly 60% of all U.S. foreign direct
investments; less than a hundred firms accounted for over 70%; and a total of 163
firms accounted for over 80% of foreign direct investments; U.S. OFFICE OF BUSINESS.
ECONOMICS, U.S. BUSINESS INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES at 74-75, 144 (U.S.
Dept. of Comm. 1960).
"35. For an exploration in depth of these issues, see D. GOULET, THE CRUEL
CHOICE (1971). And cf. Illich, Outwitting the "Developed" Countries, 13 N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS, Nov. 6, 1969, at 20, repr. in I. ILLICH, CELEBRATION OF AWARENESS 151
(1970).
36. This is forcefully asserted in Professor Johnson's article, supra note 3, the
clearest statement yet, from a neoliberal standpoint, of the incompatibility of public
goals such as "social justice" and "balanced growth" with "a profit-motivated
development process" which relies on multinational enterprise. For succinct
formulation of the problem see Lyman, Aftermath: The Multinational Corpora-
tion, 3 CENTERMAGAZINE 76, 77 (Sept. 1970).
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ited environment. There is considerable irony in this: a most persua-
sive argument in defense of a role for private enterprise (including
private foreign investment) in economic development is that the disci-
pline of the market is indispensable for the economically appropriate
allocation of resources. Governmental administrative processes and
planning calculations, it is argued, do not ensure sufficient discipline;
they allow the managers of the economy to disregard reality, to depart
considerably from economic constraints and thus allocate the country's
resources in an uneconomic fashion. The irony lies in that when the
less developed countries turn to foreign investors they are confronted
with the multinational corporation, the principal characteristic of
which is precisely the ability to ignore concrete national market con-
straints, even though remaining subject to broadly conceived market
considerations in its/global operations. 37 The objective criteria of
market performance j(prices, costs, profits) can be disregarded, with
respect to operations in any specific country, in order to enhance the
corporation's global success. The company managers' work becomes
thus similar to that of planning authorities in a governmental bureau-
cracy.
The enterprise's flexibility puts it in a position of greater freedom
from direct and indirect governmental action than other enterprise,
foreign and domestic, in the host state. In the developing nations as
elsewhere, governments attempt, in varying manners and degrees, to
coordinate and direct their national economies with a view to promot-
ing and accelerating their economic development. In dealing with the
private sector, they try through their measures-express incentives and
restrictions as well as indirect burdens and inducements-to channel
development in desired directions, to limit "inappropriate" activities
and to increase the degree of certainty in governmental prediction.
The presence and possible activities of multinational enterprise seri-
ously disturb this processSS and may detract from the carrying out of
37. The extent to which multinational corporations are subject to any real
market constraints is a matter of considerable controversy. For strong affirmation of
the large firms' ability to control their environment see J. K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); and compare Caves, Uncertainty, Market Structure and
Performance: Galbraith as Conventional Wisdom, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: IN HONOR OF E. S. MASON 283 (J. Markham & G.
Papanek eds. 1970). For present purposes it is enough to note that the multination-
al firm's ability (and intent) to operate in a world-wide market is an essential part
of its "nature" (i.e., its accepted definition).
38. For a good discussion of the pbssible. "disturbance to economic Plans,"
caused by multinational enterprise, see J. BEHRMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS, supra
note 24, at 80-84. He concludes that its presence "increases the uncertainty facing
the host government," and that overall "the ability of the host government to carry
out its economic plans is circumscribed by the spread of the multinational
enterprise .... Id. at 82.
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other, more traditional, state functions such as the collection of rev-
enue. It is probably true that by and large multinational firms
routinely comply with the legal regulations and national policies of
the states in which they operate. They still retain a choice, however,
which neither domestic enterprise nor private foreign investment in its
traditional forms possesses to the same degree: to evade such regula-
tion, especially by means of action by the parent or by foreign affili-
ates.
Financial and other relationships between subsidiaries and parent
or among subsidiaries are frequently determined on the basis of cen-
trally determined policies calculated to serve overall corporate objec-
tives. Fees and royalties paid for patents and trademarks licensing
and for technical assistance may be determined, not on the basis of
an assessment of the value of the services or knowledge transferred, but
according to tax or foreign exchange considerations. A recent study
concludes: "on balance, it was our impression that most companies
consider royalties, fees, and other types of payments to be either a
substitute for, or supplement to, dividends as a means of remitting
earnings."39 Payment of dividends is itself manipulated for various
purposes:
[W]hen in 1964 it was felt that the risk of devaluation had
become serious, the parent company directed [a wholly-
owned subsidiary in Britain] to pay interim dividends.
These, added to the subsequent year-end remittance, totalled
about 130% of that year's earnings .... 40
Transfer pricing, the setting of special prices for goods sold by
one affiliate to another, is also widely used to similar effect: 41 to
reduce the income tax paid by the firm, to cope with import duties, to
increase the liquid funds available to an affiliate, to hedge against
devaluation or other currency changes. Terms of payment, as well, can
be manipulated. To hedge against devaluation, for instance, the sub-
sidiary in the country likely to devalue its currency may be required to
prepay or pay upon delivery for goods provided by subsidiaries in
39. M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS, supra note 17, at 162.
40. Id at 168.
41. See id at 172-176; 1. Shulman, Transfer Pricing in Multinational Business
(D.B.A. Diss., Harvard, 1966); Shulman, When the Price Is Wrong- By Desigfn, 2
COLUM. J. WORLD BUSINESS 69 (May-June 1967), repr. in READINGS IN INTERNATION-
AL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 184 (A. Stonehill ed. 1970); L TURNER, INVISIBLE
EMPIRES 75-82 (1971); Rose, The Rewarding Strategies of Multinationalism,78
FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 1968, at 100; J. GREENE & M. DUERR, INTERCOMPANY TRANSACTIONS
IN THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM: A SURVEY (Conference Board study, n.d. [1969?]).
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other countries, while the latter may be allowed lengthy delays in
making their payments to the former.
The variety and ingenuity of these methods and devices should
not obscure the fact that they are calculated to evade although not
necessarily to violate, in the strict sense, the laws and policies of the
host countries. Such practices may also have other consequences. 42 For
instance, most investment incentive legislation in less developed coun-
tries provides for repatriation of foreign investors' earnings up to
certain limits, frequently determined as a percentage of the capital
brought into the country. If, through its pricing of the capital equip-
ment imported, the investing corporation is able to inflate the appar-
ent value of its initial investment, it is in a position to increase
correspondingly its remittance of earnings. Not only are the host
country's exchange reserves affected, but, as a side-effect, the statistical
picture of the economy's performance is falsified, thus making plan-
ning and other calculations more difficult. In cases of monetary crisis,
too, the multinational enterprise frequently uses its resources to pro-
tect itself against changes in currency values. While company execu-
tives insist that their manipulations of currency are purely defensive
and not speculative, the distinction between defense and speculation is
not always easy to make. One major company found this out when it
made "by miscalculation" a profit of over a million dollars by hedging
against devaluation of the British pound.43 Whatever the precise mo-
tivation, such protective activities, conducted on an enormous scale, are
likely to bring about the events they are defending against.44
42. Their effects on the enterprise's own workings should not be underesti-
mated. One way or another, they involve dual bookkeeping practices, with all their
complications. For a critique, from a management viewpoint see Shulman, When
the Price Is Wrong - By Design, supra note 41, Several observers report that, quite
frequently, managers of affiliates whose "profits picture" is adversely affected by
such manipulations are, illogically but predictably, chided or penalized by central
management. Cf. id.; M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS, supra note 17, at 117-121.
43. See 84 FORTUNE, July 1971, at 37; Ulman, Corporate Treasurers Make
Moves That Shake World Monetary Scene, Wall St. J., May 29, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
44. On the activities of American multinational firms during recent monetary
crises see Stabler, How Multinational Firm Protects Its Flanks in Monetary
Dealings, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1971, at 1. And cf Kraus, New York Letter-Whose
Crisis? EUROMONEY, June 1971, at 44. Professor Stobaugh has again pointed out that
me willingness, if not the ability, of multinational firms to expend efforts in such
financial dealings has been much exaggerated.
To be sure, important savings can be made by financial manipula-
tions, but such savings are small in relation to the earnings received from
capitalizing on a firm's special strengths, such as technical know-how,
managerial and marketing expertise, or a capacity to raise large sums of
money.
Stobaugh, The Multinational Corporation: Measuring the Consequences, 6
COLUM J. WoaL BUSINESS 59, 62 (Jan.-Feb. 1971).
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Government authorities in the countries of operation of multina-
tional firms are, of course, aware of the possibility of such practices.
Customs and tax officials are often authorized to refuse to accept a
firm's declared prices and to assess taxes or duties on the basis of
alternative calculations. 45 Considerable complications often follow.
The situation is much worse, for both parties but especially for the
government, in less developed countries, where the governmental ma-
chinery is often defective and civil servants lack many of the skills and
expertise required to properly review the companies' declarations.4 6
Multinational enterprise may have difficulty in becoming an inte-
gral part of the national economy of host countries. The very sophis-
tication in production and management which makes it efficient may
condemn it to an enclave status, especially where the rest of the
economy in the host country is not at the same level of technological
and managerial skills. The centralization of its management, more-
over, goes counter to the widespread desire of host governments to
encourage joint ventures between foreign and domestic firms.47 To
the extent that joint ventures place a degree of real control and
genuine decision-making power in the hands of local partners, they
tend to reduce the power of central management; they thereby de-
crease the operative integration of the multinational firm and contra-
dict the logic of its existence. Similar problems arise with respect to
research and development activities, which normally tend to be con-
centrated at headquarters.48 The home country's technological lead
is thus strengthened, the host's scientific and technological develop-
ment is slowed down and a relationship of long-term technological
dependence is likely to come about.
All these factors tend to exacerbate the multinational firm's for-
eign character. It is a principal actor in the host society and economy
but it pointedly remains an alien actor. Its presence and growth are
thus perceived as bringing about a shifting of effective decision-making
capacity from persons and institutions located within the territory to
45. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 482, authorizing the Internal Revenue
Service to reallocate, for tax purposes, income among members of a corporate
family; cf. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 996-999 (1968)
and citations therein.
46. See Seers, Big Companies and Small Countries: A Practical Proposal, 16
KYKLOS 599 (1963).
47. See W. G. FRIEDMANN & J.-P. BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1971).
48. For a recent study see M. DUERR, R & D IN THE MULTINATIONAL COMPANY:
A SURVEY (Conference Board, n.d. f 1970?]).
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"centers of decision" outside it.49 In the weak and vulnerable societies
of less developed countries, such a shift may bring about a gradual
distortion of the entire economy. In terms not only of economic struc-
tures but also of population attitudes and skills, the host countries may
evolve in the direction'of increased dependence-to a capitalism of
"foreign capitalists and local workers." 5 0 In the view of some Latin
American economists, the expansion of United States multinational
enterprise in the most dynamic sectors of their economies frustrates
the Latin American countries' potential for autonomous national de-
velopment and leads to a condition of long-run dependence.51
At this point the much-disputed question of "extraterritoriality"
must be broached. Host countries, especially developed ones, bitterly
complain of the efforts of United States administrative and judicial
authorities to extend the application of some United States laws and
policies to activities of multinational enterprise units located outside
the country. This has been the nearly exclusive area of legal concern
among the problems relating to multinational enterprise. The issue is
49. See FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANAIDIAN INDUSTRY:
REPORT-OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY 27 (Ottawa,
1968) (hereinafter cited as WATKINS REPORT).
Foreign control means the potential shift outside the country of the
locus of some types of decision-making. The extent to which decision-
making within the host country is eroded varies with circumstances, and
basically depends on the power of the foreign firm and its government
relative to the government of the host country. To the extent decision-
making is eroded, national independence-being, in a broad sense, the
ability to make decisions in the national interest-is reduced. But the
effects on independence are not solely in the direction of reduction.
Foreign ownership opens up new channels of communication, public and
private, which are, in principle, two-way. Hence foreign ownership may
increase national independence in some respects ....
50. "A workable capitalist system is one which is made up of local capitalists,
not foreign capitalists and local workers." Felipe Pazos, Discussion of the Papers, in
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 205 (J. Adler & P. Kuznets eds.
1967).
51. See C. FURTADO, OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 29-37, 58-64
(1970); Ferrer, Industrias Bdsicas, Integraci6n y Corporaciones Internacionales, in
H.JAGUARIBE ET AL., LA DEPENDENCIA POLITICO-ECONOMICA DE AMERICA LATINA 87
(1969); Galeano, De-Nationalization and Brazilian Industry, 21 MONTHLY REV. 11
(Dec. 1969). The recent Latin American literature on the phenomenon of
dependence is, of course, closely related to these problems; see Dos Santos, The
Structure of Dependence, 60 AM. ECON. Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS 231 (1970) and the
contributions by Helio Jaguaribe and others in the volume cited above.
The historical experience of Latin American countries is particularly relevant.
Charles Anderson has observed that foreign investors were the primary political
constituency of Latin American governments in the late nineteenth century; the
nation-state system, transplanted across the ocean in the absence of the conditions
that had led to its creation in Western Europe, found function and legitimacy in its
dealings with foreign traders and investors and its integration into the "internation-
al system of liberal economics." See C. ANDERSON, POLITICS AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN
LATIN AMERICA 18-36 (1967).
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complicated by the obvious fact that in this respect the companies'
interests and preferences (i.e., to be left alone) appear largely to coin-
cide with those of the host states. Accordingly, we are treated to the mov-
ing spectacle of eminent lawyers, closely associated with multination-
al firms, engaging in vigorous and eloquent defense of the host coun-
tries' sovereignty against infringement by the United States.52
The chief areas of conflict have been those of antitrust law, se-
curities and exchange disclosure requirements, export controls, and,
in a somewhat different manner and to a more limited extent, balance
of payments policies.53 The doctrinal posture of the issues has
differed from case to case and, in a rough manner, from area to area.
In antitrust and securities regulation, courtsand administrative agen-
des have relied mainly on the so-called "objective territoriality" prin-
ciple as the ground for claiming jurisdiction,54 while in the case of
export and investment controls, they have relied on the parent firm's
nationality.55
The problems caused by "extraterritoriality" are the consequence
of unequal structural relationships between the principal home coun-
try, the United States, and the host states. Traditional international
law relies on reciprocity to induce symmetrical resolution of such
conflicts. In the presence of radical inequality, however, reciprocity is
of no avail: Canada is not interested in applying its anticombines laws
on United States subsidiaries of Canadian parents (or even on parents
of Canadian subsidiaries). Even if it did, it is unlikely that such action
would seriously affect the United States economy. Proper analysis of the
extraterritoriality issue must distinguish between the various areas in
which it can be found as well as the kinds of conflicts that have arisen
or may arise.56 It should further consider the interests affected on
52. It seems unnecessary, but prudent, to add that not all opponents of
"extraterritoriality" fall in this category.
53. Peculiar problems of quasi-extraterritorial application of U.S. direct for-
eign investment controls appear to have occurred only in Canada, whose govern-
ment, in exchange for partial exemption from the restrictions, undertook to enforce
on its own substantially similar measures. See K. LEVITT, SILENT SURRENDER: THE
MVLTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN CANADA 9-15 (1970); WATKINS REPORT, supra note
49, at 263-266, 336-338; Litvak & Maule, Conflict Resolution and Extraterritoriality,
13 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 305, 317-318 (1969). United States balance of payments
controls have had a less direct but significant impact elsewhere, as well; see
Goldberg & Kindleberger, Toward a GATT For Investment: A Proposal For
Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 L. & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 295,
306-310 (1970). And cf. J. BEHRMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS, supra note 24, at 88-100.
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RrLATIONS §18 (1965).
55. For other cases where the parent's nationality was deemed of controlling
importance, see Vagts, supra note 2, at 741, note 11.
56. For an analysis applying Kenneth Boulding's model of conflictual situa-
tions see Litvak & Maule, supra note 53.
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each side (economic, political, other; common, special; exclusive,
inclusive, etc.), the identity and character of decision-makers (courts,
administrative officials, etc.), the degree of governmental involvement
on each side, and other concrete factors of this type. In the absence of
such detailed scrutiny, it can only be said that a simplistic geometrical
conception of national jurisdiction will not suffice.
The importance of the whole issue is a matter of continuing
dispute. It was repeatedly asserted in the Watkins Report that "the
most serious cost to Canada of foreign ownership and control results
from the tendency of the United States government to regard Ameri-
can-owned subsidiaries as subject to American law and policy" in the
areas of antitrust and export and investment controls.57 On the other
hand, it has been cogently argued that the real significance of the
problem has been much exaggerated: in fact, few cases of conflict
occur, and these are relatively unimportant and can be adequately
dealt with by normal diplomatic and other methods.58 These posi-
tions are not as contradictory as they may look. Conflicts between
home and host states over extraterritoriality are real, even though they
may not directly involve vital interests. Their importance lies in what
they reveal about the host country's condition. Such conflicts, like
other, equally infrequent, personal and collective crises, are "the tip of
the iceberg;" 5 9 they serve to illuminate obscure aspects of pre-
existing reality-namely, the extent of the host country's penetration
by and dependence on persons, institutions and forces whose loyalties
(and interests) lie outside the host nation.
The argument thus reaches a fundamental theoretical question:
the relationship between multinational enterprise and nation-state. The
basic problem remains that the growth of multinational enterprise takes
57. WATKINS REPORT, supra note 49, at 360; cJ. id. at 48, 345, 407. The
chairman of the Task Force, however, has significantly qualified his own present
position on this point: "One does not have to believe that [extraterritoriality] is 'the
most serious issue'-it is not: The economic and political disintegration of Canada
consequent on pervasive American economic penetration ranks higher .... " Wat-
kins, Canada Can't Wish Away Legal Imperialism, in GORDON TO WATKINS TO YOU
204, 205-206 (D. Godfrey and M. Watkins eds. 1970).
58. See, e.g., Rubin, The International Firm and the National Jurisdiction, in
THE INTERNATIONAL C.OPORATION 170 (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970). Qualifications to
this view, already present in this article, were later given greater emphasis by the
author; cf Statement of S. Rubin, in A Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970s-
The Multinational Corporation and International Investment, supra note 14, at
921; Rubin, supra note 2, at 21.
59. See Watkins, Preface to K. LEVITT, supra note 53, at xui-xiv, quoting
Professor A. Rotstein. And cf. A. Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970s-Part 4-
The Multinational Corporation and International Investment, supranote 14, at 915
(Watkins), 920 (Rubin).
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place in spite of, and therefore potentially in opposition to, the exer-
cise of authority by nation states. Most economists and business experts
acknowledge this basic contradiction, although the lessons they draw
from it differ. In the guise of proposals for a "reconciliation," many
have suggested that the multinational enterprise should and will even-
tually prevail; a few expect the nation-state to win, while still others
conclude that a compromise between the two institutions must eventu-
ally be worked out. This is a very large problem, but no discussion of
multinational enterprise can totally ignore it.
The argument on behalf of the multinational enterprise's eventu-
al triumph usually has two limbs: one extols the virtues as well as the
inevitability of multinational enterprise; the other denigrates the na-
tion state, especially in its economic functions. Multinational enter-
prise is seen as a constructive and beneficial institution, which makes
possible a more efficient allocation of world resources by transcending
national frontiers, while the nation state is depicted as an archaic
institution, governed by narrow-minded and incompetent bureau-
cracies and overtaken by economic and technological development.
Both limbs of the argument may be contested. The first is at best
inadequate. There is a strong flavor of economic (and technological)
determinism in much of the writing in support of multinational enter-
prise. It is apparently assumed that what the economic and productive
forces command (i.e., internationalization of markets and production)
the legal and political institutions must eventually carry out. 60 Or, in
a different jargon, that changes in the economic-productive infrastruc-
ture will directly and necessarily determine relations in the legal and
political superstructure.61 In reality, it is by no means certain that
economic and technological forces will continue to spur the growth of
multinational enterprise. 62 Moreover, the latter's proponents appear to
60. See, e.g., G. W. Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being Stateless, in
WORLD BUSINESS-PROMISE AND PROBLEMS 330 (C. Brown ed. 1970); Fayerweather,
19th-Century Ideology and2Oth- Century Reality, in WORLD BUSINESS-PROMISE AND
PROBLEMS 85 (C. Brown ed. 1970); Jacoby, The Multinational Corporation, 3
CENTER MAGAZINE, May 1970, at 37.
61. To make explicit what the reformulation implies, there is in some of these
writings a remarkable flavor of what Marxian theorists would call "vulgar
Marxism", that is oversimplified, unilinear economic determinism. Another appo-
site analogy looks to the free-trade controversies of the mid-nineteenth century,
when "many prominent Britons expected free trade to tame the nation-state." See
Stevens, Scanning the Multinational Firm, 14 BUSINESS HORIZONS, June 1971, at 47,
53.
62. Hymer & Rowthorn, Multinational Corporations and International Oligo-
poly: The Non-American Challenge, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 57 (C.
Kindleberger ed. 1970), contest the validity of both the description of the past and
the predictions for the future. They observe, inter alia, that technological growth in
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place inordinate emphasis on economic criteria. Values and prefer-
ences not founded on economic efficiency, alternative orderings of
priorities on the basis of political, social, moral or cultural consider-
ations are in their view to be effectively disregarded, in the name of
welfare and internationalism.63 But it is not self-evident that efficien-
cy, determined as it is by reference to a narrow range of "economic"
criteria, should have in all cases pride of place among possible criteria.
The second limb of the proposition, the condemnation of the
nation state, is also far from persuasive. For all its failures and prob-
lems, the nation is probably the single most powerful social institu-
tion; it commands intense loyalty and respect from its subjects. Far
from being on the decline, national autonomy, the ability of territorial
communities freely to decide matters affecting their fate, lies at the
core of a whole constellation of legal concepts and institutions (sover-
eignty, independence, self-determination, equality of states) and con-
stitutes the focus of human aspirations in new countries and old. It
would not do to disregard the failings and inadequacies of the notion
(and the reality) of nation; and it is certainly possible to imagine
other principles and methods of ordering human affairs and relation-
ships on the planet. At this moment, however, none of these methods
is or has a chance of being operative. National autonomy remains the
principal legal (as well as political and moral) concept which serves to
defend (although by no means wholly effectively) the weaker mem-
bers of the international community from the overreaching of the
more powerful. It is not without significance that the calls for the
disappearance or downgrading of the nation state come most often
from representatives of (or citizens in) the most developed and most
powerful nations.
In a more narrow context, it is useful to remember that national
governments carry out functions which no other institution per-
forms. Some of these functions are economic in character: as Professor
the near future could well work against the multinational enterprise. Alternatively,
Richard N. Farmer shows persuasively that the past two decades' expansion is not
likely to be repeated in the coming decades. Farmer, Where Does Business Go From
HereP, 23 TEMPLE U. -EcoN. & BULL. See, in agreement, Robinson, The
Future of International Management, 2. J. INrrL BUSINESS STUDIES 60, 67 (Spring
1971).
63. Mr. Ball did acknowledge, in a statement before a committee of the
Canadian House of Commons, that "Compelling considerations that relate to
spiritual and cultural needs.., should take high priority." This led him to raise the
question of "the extent to which those needs can be met with minimum sacrifice to
the objective of efficient resource use" which is best served by multinational
enterprise. STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE,
CAN. HOUSE OF COMMONS, 28th PARL., 2D. SESS. PROCEEDINGS No. 33
(REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE RESPECTING CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS) 54 (1970),
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Hymer has noted, modern national government is expected to utilize
fiscal and monetary policies as instruments for assuring full employ-
ment and price stability. "If national power is eroded, who is to per-
form the government's functions?"6 4
The argument is sometimes couched in slightly different terms:
the growth of multinational enterprise is seen as a benign manifesta-
tion of growing international interdependence; to reject its claims in
favor of an illusory national independence would be retrogressive. But
the assertion of national autonomy does not necessarily imply a denial
of the fact, or of the desirability, of increasing interdependence. It
only seeks to shape its particular form. A relation of interdependence
may exist between equals as well as between unequals. In the former
case the parties retain their independence; in the latter, the relation-
ship is one of domination, from the stronger party's viewpoint, and
dependence, if not oppression, from the point of view of the weaker
party.65 It is far too easy-and the powerful have sought to do it ever
since the days of Menenius Agrippa 6 6-to invoke interdependence as
an excuse for domination.
An Agenda for Research
At this stage we can only state issues and ask questions. Not only
are empirical data lacking but so are adequate interpretations of their
meaning, the fruits of close analysis of positions, concepts and argu-
ments. We shall never find out all we should know, but we should at
least be aware of the extent of our ignorance.
A caveat is needed: this whole essay has been couched in terms of
possible and probable actions and effects; at this level of generality,
one can only discuss what may happen, at most what is likely to
happen. The actual behavior and impact of multinational enterprise
in any particular country, however, can be studied with much greater
precision. It is only on the basis of such concrete, specific (although
perhaps never fully exhaustive) findings that proper measures and
policies may be undertaken.
64. Hymer, The Efficiency (Contradictions) of Multinational Corporations, 40
AM. EcoN. ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS 441, 448 (1970); and cf. Hymer & Rowthorn, supra
note 62; Rotstein, Binding Prometheus, in CLOSE THE 49TH PARALLEL, ETc.-THE
AMERICANIZATION OF CANADA 209, 222 (I. Lumsden ed. 1970).
65. See F. PERROU X, "INDEPENDANCE" DE L'ECONOMIE NATIONALE ET INTERDEPEN-
DANCE DES NATIONS 133 ff. (1969). In the context of multinational enterprise, see, in
essential agrreement, Mason, The Corporation in the Post-Industrial State-IL. The
Corporation Abroad, 12 CAL. MANAGEMENT REV. 15 (Summer 1970); Waltz, The
M yth of National Interdependence, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 205 (C.
Kindleberger ed. 1970).
66. Cf W. SHAKESPEARE, CORIOLANUS, Act. I, Sc. I; PLUTARCH, -CORIOLANUS.Vi.
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A first area of inquiry is that of the role of multinational enter-
prise in the economy of developing countries and in the world econo-
my. Behavioral as well as quantitative data are needed. It is plausible
that the role will vary with the industry, as well as with such factors as
the degree of control over the industry, the size of the firms, the
nationality of the parent. Our information on the actual conduct of
multinational firms often consists of anecdotes and fragments. We
need to know more about their relationships with other firms, domes-
tic and foreign, their role in trade associations, their routine contacts
with home and host governments, the ways in which they behave-
in the same manner as, or differently from, domestic firms, large and
small, and government-owned corporations. We need to learn more
about their transnational operations: more evidence of their vaunted
efficiency, their ability to mobilize resources; more information on the
criteria-"guidelines" and "rules of thumb"--they use in making
their choices. Transfer pricing and other transactions between affili-
ates have yet to receive the serious legal study they deserve. They raise
important and difficult problems for legal theory and the law of
contracts, problems strangely reminiscent of those arising in con-
nection with the "planned" contracts between state enterprises in
socialist law. 67
A second area, closely linked to the first, is that of the multina-
tional enterprise's actual and potential impact on the national inter-
ests of the host (and home) countries. It is no longer a matter of
collecting data, of course. The firm's behavior, its patterns of practice,
its processes of decision-making may involve largely the collection of
factual data, although these are neither rigid and inflexible "things"
nor always clear, precise and uniform. To articulate the operative
forces in, and values and interests of, the host country, however, differ-
ent methods are needed. Total precision and unanimous agreement
are improbable. In the past decade, the debate over the role of mul-
tinational (United States-based) enterprise in Canada has resulted in
considerable research and study of the related issues. There is proba-
bly no other country in the world today where the extent of foreign
ownership and the behavior of foreign-owned firms have been studied
as thoroughly. Although the quality and relevance of discussion have
undoubtedly improved, the intensity of the controversy is higher than
ever.
In studying these questions, differentiations between industries,
67. On the latter see J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAw 326-28, 353-64
(1969); J. HAZARD, I. SHAPIRO & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 261-89 (1969).
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firms and kinds of firms, will probably be necessary. Which particular
interests (national, however defined, or factional) are affected in each
category of cases? What kinds of decisions, within the multinational
firm, are taken outside the country?68 On the other hand, the most
basic, and most important, of the terms currently used have yet to be
adequately elucidated: What is the meaning of "national interests" in
each particular context? What is meant by such terms as "infringment
of sovereignty," "increased uncertainty," "loss of control," "depen-
dence?" Complete and final clarity is no doubt impossible, but some
further precision is indispensable.
A third area of exploration is that of the possible forms and
degrees of coexistence of state and multinational enterprise. Hymer
and Rowthorn most appositely juxtapose the laissez faire-
multinational enterprise trend toward worldwide integration across
national frontiers on an industry by industry basis to the socialist
conception of the centrally planned state integrating all industries
within one territory. In response, Robert Heilbroner stressed the myr-
iad other possibilities lying somewhere between these two extremes. 69
The degree of autonomy and internal coherence a state needs to
survive does not have to coincide with comprehensive central plan-
ning. The search for international allocation of resources may not
require absolute freedom from state-imposed restraints. This is not a
call for a checklist of formal devices; what is needed is identification
and analysis of possibly separable functions and operations and de-
tailed exploration of likely combinations.
The absence of reasonably settled conclusions concerning the
specific effects of multinational enterpise in developing countries does
not make necessary a policy of general abstention from action. It is
possible to fall back, for the time being, on certain assumptions con-
cerning private and public interests and activities. Within national
societies, even in states which consider themselves capitalist, a private
firm's judgment of efficiency and of the necessities of optimum oper-
ation, being founded on criteria of private advantage, is not accepted
as necessarily coinciding with national interest, economic and other,
which is judged on the basis of criteria of public advantage. The
possibility of a divergence between the two is admitted, and it is
further accepted that, in at least some cases of conflict between private
and public advantage, government has the duty to take legal action to
68. For an attempt to answer this particular question, in specific context, see K.
LEvirr,supra note 53, at 77 ff.; Cf. WATKINS REPORT, supra note 49, at 191 if.
69. Hymer & Rowthorn, supra note 62, at 86. Heilbroner, The Multinational
Corporation and the Nation-State, 16 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs 20, 24-25 (Feb. 11, 1971).
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ensure that public advantage will prevail. It seems reasonable to make
the same assumption in matters international. It is true that the lines
of authority concerning the determination of common international
interests are by no means clear, but this does not mean that such
interests do not exist or should not be respected. Nor is it reasonable
to assume that whenever the interests of an international actor clash
with those of nation states, the former necessarily coincide with the
interests of the international community. We are left with certain
facts: multinational enterprise is a powerful international actor, suc-
cessfully operating in an environment which does not much resemble
the free and perfect market of classical economics and where effective
public controls appear to be lacking. It cannot be assumed, under
these conditions, that no possibility of abuse of power exists or that
actions inconsistent with the public interests are unlikely. Legal regu-
lation in one form or another is indicated.
Company Policies and Structures
Before reviewing the possible forms of legal regulation, it is
useful to consider some possible attitudes and policies of multinational
firms which are likely to temper or avoid conflicts with nation states.
This is a topic on which business writers and economists have made
significant contributions.
Starting with a useful distinction between valid conflicts, which
cannot be resolved by mere accommodation, and pseudo-conflicts,
based on misconceptions and prejudice, Professor Fayerweather suggests
that while the latter can be minimized by an "effort to achieve max-
imum accommodation among the interests of the parties," the former
can only be resolved "through negotiation based on relative economic
and political power relationships."70 Continuing flexibility concern-
ing the "terms df its relationships in a host country" is the appropriate
attitude for the firm. Focusing more concretely on the modalities of a
multinational firm's relationship with the host government, Professor
Raymond Vernon has stressed the multiplicity of choices open to the
parties: from wholly-owned subsidiary to joint venture to coproduction
agreement to technical assistance (and management) contract.71 Alter-
natives to equity control have been persuasively supported by Richard
70. J. FAYERWEATHER, supra note 17, at 87-132 (quoted material at 131, 132).
71. See Vernon, Conflict and Resolution between Foreign Direct Investors and
Less Developed Countries, 17 PUBLIC POLICY 333 (1968).
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D. Robinson,72 while the time dimension of control has been imagina-
tively explored in a recent essay by Albert 0. Hirshman.7 3 Yet,
"where inherent conflicts of interest exist between the economy of the
host country and foreign investor," such devices may prove ineffec-
tive.7 4
Increasing internationalization of multinational enterprise, in-
outlook, management and ownership, is frequently seen as the most
promising avenue for the elimination of its conflicts with the nation
states. Several writers favor a tripartite classification, in which the
basic test is the extent to which company management adopts and im-
plements attitudes and policies oriented toward the home country alone,
toward each of the several host countries, or toward the international
economy as a whole. 7 5 It is the firm at the third stage, the most interna-
tional in character, that business writers appear to prefer; others point to
the advantages of the second stage, where each component of the firm
is primarily oriented toward the host country in which it is located.
Bringing into focus both company and host country attitudes, Profes-
sor Perlmutter has pointed out that while conflict may be avoided
when either side acquiesces to the predominance of the other's ap-
proach, such situations are unstable and economically less beneficial.
Where both parties adopt a global view of business methods and
attitudes (a "geocentric" approach) not only is conflict avoided but
benefits to both are maximized. 7 6
72. Robinson, Who Needs Equity?, in WORLD BUSINESS-PROMISE AND PROBLEMS
268 (C. Brown ed. 1970); R. ROBINSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS POLICY (1964);
Robinson, Joint Ventures or Transnational Business' 6 INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT
REV. 59 (Fall 1964). And cf. W. FRIEDMANN & G. KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS VENTURES (1961); W. FRIEDMANN & J.-P. BEGUIN, supra note 44. These
questions have been extensively studied and discussed in recent years in UN and
UNCTAD documents, under the general rubric of "transfer of technology to de-
veloping countries."
73. A. HIRSCHMAN, How TO DIVEST IN LATIN AMERICA AND WHY (ESSAYS IN
INT'L FINANCE, No. 76. 1969), repr. in THE WIDENING GAP: DEVELOPMENT IN THE
1970s 252 (B. Ward, J. Runnals, & L. D'Anjou 1971).
74. Vernon, The Role of U.S. Enterprise Abroad, 98 DAEDALUS 113, 123
(1919).
75. The three types (or stages) of multinational enterprise are variously
named "ethnocentric," "polycentric" and "geocentric" Perlmutter, The Tortuous
Evolution of the Multinational Corporation, in WORLD BUSINESS-PROMISE AND
PROBLEMS 66, 69 (C. Brown ed. 1970); and Perlmutter, L'entreprise internationale-
Trois conceptions, 23 REV. ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE 151 (1965) ), "national,"
"multinational" and "international" (C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 7, at 179-85),
or "national," "multinational" and "global" (WATKINS REPORT, supra note 49, at
33). Use of the term "multinational enterprise" in this essay does not follow any of
these taxonomies.
76. Perlmutter, Problbmes d'architecture sociale des entreprises multination-
ales, 25 REV. ECONOMIQUE ET NOCIALE 167 (1967).
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However promising this approach may be for the distant future,
it is hardly realistic under present conditions. Few firms can be said to
be significantly "internationalized" or "denationalized" as yet. From
the point of view of less developed countries, moreover, such compan-
ies remain alien, even after some evolution toward internationaliza-
tion, since management and effective control remain in the hands of
nationals of developed countries. For a firm to become truly interna-
tional, much more is needed than some diversity of nationality among
shareholders and managers. The host countries' participation in the
company's operations must be genuine; the whole structure of the
enterprise must be altered better to serve the host states' needs. The
late Karl Lachmann made the point clearly a few years ago:
[A]s long as ownership and management control remain cen-
tered in the company's country of origin... and as long as the
bulk of the company's profits continues to originate in this
country, it will be hard to convince the governments of the
subsidiaries' host countries of the truly international inspira-
tion of the company's business policies ....
It is only when all three factors-ownership, management
and income-are truly internationalized that one could ex-
pect even the more susceptible of these governments to ac-
cept control of domestic enterprises by such international
companies as the price of securing continued access to the
latest technological advances ....
To be acceptable and effective, international co-
operation of the kind contemplated will require above all a
judicious international division of functions. It would indeed
not be enough for the "parent" company to grant unrestrict-
ed access to its financial and technological facilities to all
foreign member companies. This would neither free the lat-
ter from a position of foreign dependency nor would it satisfy
the former that it was receiving adequate consideration for
its largesse.77
77. Lachmann, The Role of International Business in the Transfer of Tech-
nology to Developing Countries, 60 AM. J. INT'L L (PRoc.) 31, 36-37 (1966). The
modalities of this "division of functions" are further articulated in a United
Nations Secretariat report prepared under Lachmann's direction:
[E]nterprises in developing countries... may, for example, take over
the production for export to the other member companies of products
under... voluntary transfer arrangements; they [mayl also establish special
research facilities addressed to the particular adaptation problems of
developing countries which can serve the needs of component enterprises
in the other such countries; they could also offer jointly with member
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Moreover, the multinational firm remains a private institution,
however international in outlook. Considerations concerning the con-
trol by the state of the power of "private governments" obtain in its
case with particular force. Some of the more speculative essays tran-
scend this problem by predicting for the near future a radical increase
in the political and social commitment of business in general, and
international bfsiness in particular. Losing much of its private-
economy-based autonomy, multinational enterprise would then be-
come integrated in a world-wide welfare state process. 78
The effort to find modes of conflict settlement through adaptation
of the multinational enterprise rather than through state action is
necessary and important. The enterprise is a principal actor in inter-
national economic relations. To ignore its possibilities for change and
for adjustment not only to economic and physical conditions but to
legal and political ones, as well, leads to a partial and defective picture
of reality. The explorations of economists and management experts in
this direction are therefore useful and proper. Yet they do not render
unnecessary further inquiry into the possibilities of action by the states
concerned. National or international action may better clarify the
policies and preferences of individual states and the world community.
Through information, promises of rewards and threats of sanctions,
states may help to induce company action in appropriate directions. As
a general rule, complex situations demand simultaneous action on
many fronts and by many actors. An additional consideration obtains
in the case of less developed countries. Promotion of their develop-
ment is today a fundamental goal of the international legal order. All
activities of transnational actors that seriously impinge upon it, there-
fore, are proper subjects for international legal regulation designed to
ensure conformity with the goals of the international legal order.
The Forms of Legal Regulation
Conflicts arising out of the existence and activities of multinational
enterprise may involve two or more of three basic parties. There may
be conflicts (of interests or policies) between a multinational firm and
its home country, a multinational firm and a host country, and be-
companies in developed countries special training facilities for technical
staff at certain levels for the entire group.
UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19 (1968).
78. See, e.g., Crozier, A New Rationale for American Business, 98 DAEDALUS
147 (1969); Robinson, supra note 62. On a closely related but more general issue,
that of the "social responsibility" of business, cf. Bell, The Corporation and Society
in the 1970's, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5 (No. 24, Summer 1971).
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tween home and host countries because of the firm's operations. As-
suming that in the first two situations the other country in each case
(host and home, respectively) is not involved, e.g., because its interests
are not affected, a fourth situation may also be posited, of likely
incidence and importance in the future, where both host and home
countries are in conflict with a multinational firm. The typical legal
discussion until recently has focused on the conflicts between host and
home countries, arising largely because of the latter's efforts to regu-
late some of the multinational firm's activities outside its territory. The
cases where the multinational firm's interests are in conflict with those of
the home or the host state are equally, if not more, important. The
activities of American multinational corporations during several recent
monetary crises are one case, among many, where the interests, or at
least the policies, of the home country did not coincide with those of
multinational enterprise based in it.79 Yet the likelihood of a conflict
between host country and multinational enterprise appears by and
large greater than that between home country and multinational en-
terprise. The latter's executives are less likely to disregard or deliber-
ately injure the interests of their home nation. On the other hand, the
home country's government often perceives (by and large rightly) the
foreign activities of companies based in its territory as being in its own
national interest.
The listing of possible conflict situations indirectly indicated the
possible forms the legal regulation of multinational enterprise activi-
ties may take. They are: unilateral action (1) by the host country or (2)
by the home country; bilateral action (3) by two host countries or (4)
by the home and a host country; and multilateral action (5) on a
universal, or nearly so, basis, including both host and home countries
or (6) on a non-universal basis, by particular groups of countries.
Some of these categories of measures have been in extensive, some-
times controversial, use; others have been used little or not at all.
None can be deemed wholly effective by itself. While unilateral state
measures may be tailored to fit particular cases and may be enforced
specifically and directly, they remain subject to avoidance by manipula-
tion of extranational resources. Bilateral arrangements can deal effec-
tively with specific problems with good chances for subsequent uni-
lateral state action in implementation. Universal or near-universal
arrangements offer useful possibilities for collecting data and for broad
debate on principles, while action by smaller groupings of states may
79. See supra note 44.
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be effective in bargaining situations, whether among states or between
states and multinational firms.
Unilateral action by host countries is the most common form of
deliberate legal regulation of multinational enterprise. Such action is
properly seen as primarily national in character, internal rather than
international; at the same time it is a most efficacious mode of interna-
tional lawmaking. Through such measures states attempt to establish
acceptable ways of dealing with other international actors, whether
other nations, international organizations or multinational corpora-
tions. These measures, together with the concurrrent or divergent
actions of the other actors, may eventually create relatively stable
expectations as to what is and is not internationally required or accept-
able. Unilateral state action toward multinational enterprise is thus an
indispensable part of the international lawmaking process in this area.
In economic terms, too, the policies of host countries are all-important.
Many of the most vocal critics of multinational enterprise have une-
quivocally emphasized that the manner and extent of its penetration
of host country economies are directly attributable to specific policies
of host governments (for instance, the imposition and administration
of tariff protection) .80
The first and most fundamental choice a prospective host state
may exercise is that of allowing or refusing entry to multinational
enterprise. The state's authority to make such a determination is un-
disputed in terms of law and nearly undisputed in terms of policy. A
state may refuse to allow any foreign investment, may allow it only in
selected fields or it may indiscriminately permit it; it may condition its
entry and establishment on several possible criteria, such as local
participation in ownership and management, employment of local
personnel, production of import substitutes or export goods; it may
require special permission for acquisition of already established local
firms. Because the flexibility of multinational enterprise greatly re-
duces the impact of indirect governmental action (i.e., action through
influence on market conditions), the host government may be led to
take more direct measures, the effectiveness of which is often doubtful.
At the very least, the feasibility of direct restrictions and conditions
varies depending on the particular industry; even developed countries,
with skilled and well-organized civil services, are reluctant to engage in
80. See, e.g., WATKINS REPORT, supra note 49, at 18, 115-120, 225-226; K.
LEvH-r, supra note 53, at 135-136; W. H. POPE, THE ELEPHANT AND THE MOUSE: A
HANDBOOK ON REGAINING CONTROL OF CANADA'S EcONOMY 20 ff. (1971).
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supervision and control of the day-to-day operations of manufacturing
enterprises.
Particular measures and devices may be used to ensure some
control over activities of local affiliates of multinational firms. Canada
is considering creation of a special administrative tribunal to deal with
company mergers, especially those involving foreign takeovers.8 1 Both
Canada and Australia have established government-controlled "de-
velopment corporations" whose precise functions and modes of oper-
ation are rather uncertain but which are dearly intended in major part
to counteract activities of foreign-controlled firms in the two coun-
tries.82 More generally legislative and administrative measures de-
signed directly or indirectly to strengthen domestic enterprise and
thus allow it to compete with or resist foreign-owned firms are often
in order.83 Revision of company and securities laws or of other
branches of business law may'be necessary to remove burdens and res-
trictions on domestic enterprise which may, unintentionally, work to
the benefit of multinational firms and to impose publicity and disclo-
sure requirements covering the activities of foreign parent and affil-
iate firms.
The actual effectiveness of such measures by host governments is
seriously limited by two basic constraints: first, the multinational en-
terprise may still have a choice, either before entry or in its operations
after establishment, to counteract and nullify the host government's
measures by actions outside the particular host country; second, in
many if not most of the less developed countries the economic and
business administrative expertise required for applying sophisticated
and elaborate controls over multinational enterprise is lacking or in
short supply. These constraints tend to reduce the actual choices open
to host governments to the initial either/or proposition of permitting
or forbidding entry. The temptation is then great to let predictions be
determined by wishes; hard decisions can be avoided by reliance on
intangible hopes or by insistence on theoretically possible but improb-
able future decisions. But there is no way to escape the necessity
for concrete, painful choices. Evasion ultimately creates worse pro-
blems.
81. See N.Y. Times, July 6, 1971, at 47, col. 3. These and other proposed
Canadian measures are critically discussed in detail in I. Feltham & W. Rauenbusch,
supra note 2.
82. For a critical discussion of the history of the Canadian case, see Pattison,
The Canada Development Corporation, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 461 (1971). And cf.
WATKINS REPORT, supra note 49, at 274, 407-08; N.Y. Times, Jan 26, 1971, at 43, col.
2. On the Australian case see 82 FORTUNE, Oct. 1970, at 48.
83. See J. BEHRMAN, NATiONAL INTERESTs, supra note 24, at 152-75.
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The home country may also exercise control, through unilateral
measures, over operations of multinational enterprise based on its
territory. When such measures are directed at activities outside the
home territory, they may lead to jurisdictional conflicts between home
and host countries. Nevertheless, in view of the general lack of effec-
tive instruments for the control of multinational enterprise, it would
be improvident to ignore the possibilities of control offered by home
government action. Such action is not in all cases objectionable, nor
does it have to be exercized in an objectionable manner. To a signifi-
cant extent, it is up to the host country's legislature, if it considers the
matter serious enough, to enact the measures necessary to block ex-
traterritorial enforcement of another country's laws. 84 The home
government for its part must act with great restraint, care and, indeed,
humility. It must make difficult distinctions between its own special
interests and policies and those more widely shared by the host coun-
try and the international community. When possible it must seek to
cooperate with the host state's authorities. The task is difficult and it
involves serious risks of conflict. Yet to suggest its wholesale abandon-
ment is too easy a solution and, in a way, a defeatist one.
From the point of view of the multinational enterprise, the appli-
cation of both home and host country laws raises problems. The firm
may sometimes be faced with inconsistent laws which result in addi-
tional burdens. It has a legitimate interest in the establishment of
internationally accepted jurisdictional principles which would allow it
prudently to plan to avoid such conflicts. On the other hand, this
argument should not be carried too far. The successful operation of
multinational enterprise is largely predicated on taking advantage of
differences between national laws and policies. It does not seem ex-
traordinary that these advantages may sometimes be turned against it.
The case of bilateral action by two host countries was listed
chiefly to complete the circle of permutations. Theoretically it is pos-
sible, although no examples are known. Apart from very special cases,
it is difficult to imagine how such action could impose significant
restraints on multinational enterprise.
Bilateral measures by host and home states have been most effec-
tive in the field of taxation. Bilateral agreements for the avoidance of
84. The WATKINS REPORT at 408-409 recommends three kinds of measures to
this end: prohibition of removal of business records in response to foreign court
orders, prohibition of compliance with foreign antitrust orders and judgments, and
collection of information concerning the impact of foreign antitrust law. A special
committee of the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on External
Affairs and National Defense recommended some of the above as well as several
additional measures; PROCEEDINGS No. 33, supra note 63, at 140-142.
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double taxation and tax evasion are now in effect among most of the
developed countries. The instruments follow a common model and are
therefore fairly uniform. As a "network" of bilateral agreements, they
represent a special case falling in between the traditional categories of
occasional bilateral agreements between particular countries, on the
one hand, and multilateral agreements, on the other. Such agreements
can help to neutralize the effects of taxation as an inducement or
obstacle to investment and business activity and they may at the same
time help in allocating the revenues generated from multinational
activities.
Several problems remain. The agreement models in use are not
directed specifically at multinational corporations, as distinct from the
more traditional types of transnational economic activity (trade, tradi-
tional foreign investment, transportation, etc.). Since the operations of
multinational enterprise often involve essentially arbitrary (i.e., not
determined by traditional external economic criteria) determination
of prices and remittances between affiliates, the incidence of income or
profits for any unit may be manipulated by the firm. Obviously, this
can be of great concern to governments, but it has not been effectively
dealt with through bilateral arrangements. It is conceivable that na-
tions might agree eventually to tax the total profits of a multinational
enterprise and allocate the revenue among themselves on the basis of
some acceptable principle.8 5 Increased cooperation in collection of
information, and even perhaps in enforcement, between tax authori-
ties of various states as well as some harmonization of tax laws would
also be useful.
International regulation is still largely missing in the area of tax
relations between developed and less developed countries. It is by now
familiar learning that the model agreements evolved to govern tax
relations between developed countries do not fit the situation where
one of the parties is developed and the other less developed. In the
past few years considerable international concern has been directed to
this problem and some patterns for possible actions are slowly emerg-
ing.S6
85. For a succinct discussion of possibilities and problems, see Vernon, The
Multinational Enterprise: Power Versus Sovereignty, 49 FOR. AFF. 736, 746-748
(1971).
86. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FISCAL
INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: REPORT OF THE
FISCAL COMMITTEE (1965); UNITED NATIONS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 21-23 (1968); UNITED NATIONS, TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1969); UNITED NATIONS, TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SECOND REPORT (1971).
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
Bilateral measures by host and home states may also be appropri-
ate in certain other situations. One illustration is the establishment of
machinery for consultations concerning application of antitrust laws
between the United States and Canada. 87
The last two sets of possibilities in our list involve multilateral
state action. The possible forms such action may take are too numer-
ous to rehearse in detail. Moreover, multilateral action by nongovern-
mental agencies is possible and, in some areas, potentially highly effec-
tive. Labor unions appear to be already involved in such action, to a
limited, as yet, but fast growing extent.88 Unilateral or multilateral
state measures could well facilitate, or impede, labor cooperation and
action across state borders.
At first glance, intergovernmental arrangements in which
both host and home countries participate would appear needed to
establish the necessary symmetry between private (multinational enter-
prise) and public (governmental) action and institutions. Further
reflection suggests that such symmetry may be in large part illusory,
because the degree and manner of actual integration of the two
"sides" differ radically. At any rate, truly universal arrangements of
this type are highly unlikely: while socialist countries may nowadays
be interested in the problems of multinational enterprise, their in-
volvement in such a scheme is improbable. Still, a large number of
other countries-for instance, most members of the International Mon-
etary Fund or the World Bank-could conceivably be interested.
There have been some recent suggestions for an international arrange-
ment of this type.
One position is bottomed on total acceptance of the beneficial and
progressive nature of multinational enterprise. In a widely cited
speech, Mr. George W. Ball complained that conflicts with nation
states obstruct and slow down the growth of multinational corpora-
tions, thereby limiting the benefits they could confer on mankind.
Accordingly he suggested that multinational enterprise should be
effectively "denationalized," by means of
87. This is the so-called Fulton-Rogers agreement (January 29, 1959), between
the then Minister of Justice of Canada and the Attorney-General of the United
States, reaffirmed by Mssrs. Basford and Mitchell in November 1969. The only
undertaking of the parties is to hold "discussions" whenever related problems arise
in order to "explore ways and means of avoiding the sort of situation which would
give rise to objections or misunderstandings." See Litvak and Maule, Conflict
Resolution and Extraterritoriality, supra note 53, at 316; Stevenson,"Extraterritori-
ality" in Canadian-United States Relations, 63 DEP'T STATE BULL. 425, 427 (1970).
88. See L. TURNER, INVISIBLE EMPIRES: MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE
MODERN WORLD 90-103 (1970); Jager, Multinationalism and Labor: For Whose
Benefit?, 5 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 56 (Jan.-Feb. 1970); Barovick, Labor Reacts to
Multinationalism, 5 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 40 (July-Aug. 1970).
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... the establishment by treaty of an international companies
law, administered by a supranational body, including rep-
resentatives drawn from various countries, who would not
only exercise normal domiciliary supervision but would also
enforce antimonopoly laws and administer guarantees with
regard to uncompensated expropriation. An international
companies law could place limitations, for example, on the
restrictions nation-states might be permitted to impose on
companies established under its sanction. The operative stan-
dard defining those limitations might be the quantity of
freedom needed to preserve the central principle of assuring
the most economical and efficient use of world resources. 89
If any attempt were made to implement this proposal, serious
problems of legal and economic policy would arise.90 Consideration
of such problems, however, may well be beside the point, since the clear
intent behind the proposal is fully to liberate, not better to regulate,
multinational enterprise. One must be profoundly convinced of the
inevitability of the growth of multinational enterprise and have no
doubts whatsoever as to its benevolent character to accept Mr. Ball's
position.
A more reasonable recent suggestion envisions a limited "General
Agreement for the International Corporation," modelled on the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This would be "an internation-
al agreement based on a limited set of universally accepted principles"
concerning those areas (taxation, antitrust, foreign exchange, export
controls, and securities regulations) where the conflicts arising from
private corporate decisions are creating, or are perceived as creating,
conflicts between governments.9' The authors of the proposal believe
that "all that is called for is a forum for the problems related to the
international corporation and some procedures which could enhance
dispute resolution in the two- or two plus-country case. This means
agreement on only the most fundamental of levels and a willingness to
work toward global solutions to a global problem." 92
89. G. W. Ball, supra note 60, at 337. For other versions of the proposal see
Ball, The Promise of the Multinational Corporation, 75 FORTUNE, June 1, 1967, at
80; Ball, Making World Corporations Into World Citizens, 8 WAR/PEAcE REP., Oct.
1968, at 8.
90. See the most effective discussions of the proposal by Seymour Rubin, supra
note 2, at 33-35, and Detlev Vagts, supra note 2, at 787-89.
91. Goldberg and Kindleberger, supra note 53, at 321-323.
92. Id. at 322. Burchill, The Multi-National Corporation: An Unsolved Prob-
lem in International Relations, 77 QUEEN'S Q. 3 (Spring 1970) offers a similar
proposal, formulating a set of related principles and linking them with the creation
of U.N.-chartered multinational corporations.
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A subsequent proposal criticizes the GATT analogy as "mislead-
ing," arguing that "there is surely no near prospect of an organization
that will administer an international agreement or agreements "concern-
ing multinational enterprise.9 3 The author proposes instead "some-
thing like [an] International Corporation Consultative Center," which
might be associated with the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development or the World Bank. But this proposal is more
ambitious than the preceding in that it would, most appropriate-
ly, distinguish between the problems that multinational enterprise
poses to developed and to developing countries. The proposed Center
seems clearly not a decision-making, or even in any effective sense a
recommendation-making, institution, comparable to any of the exist-
ing specialized agencies of the United Nations. Its purpose would be
chiefly if not exclusively analytical and advisory: "to provide a means
of encouraging and sponsoring objective and careful analysis, and to
establish a forum for regular and informed discussion." 94
The authors of both proposals are fully aware of the narrow
limits of what is realistically possible today. Other observers, too,
have stressed the necessity for such arrangements and the difficulty of
their realization. An effective decision-making internationalinstitution
in this area would have to resolve exceedingly complicated and cum-
bersome questions and would have to be based on previous agreement
among a great number of states on many acutely controversial policy
issues, where conflicts of national interests are real and not easily
reconcilable. Without such prior agreement, states would not grant
decision-making power to an institution they did not control. Howev-
er, there is today such a compelling need for more information, for
intelligent collection and analysis of data, for harmonization of statisti-
cal, administrative and legal classifications and taxonomies, for more
study on a broader basis, that even a study center with a predominantly
informational function would be most useful. The World Bank, with
its well-earned reputation for expertise and painstaking precision,
appears the most appropriate institution for taking the initiative for
the international meetings and studies that would be needed. Action
in this domain would indeed serve to complement and perhaps bal-
ance its activities in the area of investment dispute settlement. At the
same time, other international agencies might consider the possibility
of extending their technical assistance activities in the area of advice
93. Rubin, supra note 2, at 36-40.
94. Id at 40.
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and aid to prospective host countries in their negotiations and other
dealings with multinational firms. 95
Multilateral arrangements among "like-minded states" with no
claim to any degree of universality are another most interesting possi-
bility. A few such arrangements are already in existence. Perhaps the
best known, and up to now perhaps the most successful, is the Organi-
zation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, which has established
itself as a significant factor in world petroleum arrangements. An
analogous organization bringing together the principal copper produc-
ing countries which has been in formal existence for some years may
now be starting to have a life of its own.
The states that might join together in such groups would pre-
sumably share certain important common interests. This criterion is
an obvious one, but raises at the same time complex problems of
perception and interpretation. A more immediately useful test may be
that of potential competition. Collective action by individually weak
and potentially competing units is after all a common pattern of indus-
trial relations. In the current context it is evident that the developed
host countries (e.g., Canada, Australia, France), while themselves con-
cerned with the control of multinational enterprise, are in quite a
different position, in terms of interests as well as resources, than the
countries of Africa, Latin America or Asia. An international organiza-
tion which would attempt to unite countries in such differing cir-
cumstances is likely to become a forum for bargaining and debate
rather than a bargaining unit.
An illustration of the type of action under discussion is an agree-
ment among less developed countries concerning the maximum tax
concessions and other incentives they offer to investors. The beginnings
of "cutthroat competition" in this area are already apparent and joint
action would seem to be in the interest of all participants (assuming
that few or no potential competitors would be left out of the arrange-
ment). The Central American Agreement on Fiscal Incentives to
Industrial Development 96 is a well-drafted specimen of such action.
Countries in a single region, or par of a region, are indeed more
likely to come together for the purpose of bargaining with multina-
tional enterprise. Particularly interesting in this respect is the recent
Decision Concerning Treatment of Foreign Capital of the Andean
95. See Seers, supra note 46.
96. Central American Agreement on Fiscal Incentives to Industrial Develop-
ment, signed July 31, 1962 (entered into force March 1969).
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Commission. 97 Whether the decision's objective of national control
over foreign enterprise is realistic and can be substantially realized is
at this point an open question. The reaction of multinational firms
and their future relations with the Andean states should provide some
important, and sorely lacking, indication of concrete possibilities of
action in similar directions.
97. Andean Commission, Decision No. 24, Standard Regime for Treatment of
Foreign Capitals and for Treatment of Marks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties
(Dec. 31, 1970), transl. in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 152 (1971). For some first
comments and analyses, see Schliesser, Restrictions of Foreign Investment in the
Andean Market, 5 INTL LAW. 586 (1971); Diaz, The Andean Common Market:
Challenge to Forezgn Investors, 6 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 22 (July-Aug. 1971);
Petersen, ANCOM-An Andean Paradox, id. at 29; Florez, ANCOM-A Peru-
vian Viewpoint, id. at 35.
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